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Abstract The primary objective of this paper is to introduce a new epistemic paradox
that puts pressure on the claim that justification is closed under multi premise deduc-
tion. The first part of the paper will consider two well-known paradoxes—the lottery
and the preface paradox—and outline two popular strategies for solving the paradoxes
without denying closure. The second part will introduce a new, structurally related,
paradox that is immune to these closure-preserving solutions. I will call this paradox,
The Paradox of the Pill. Seeing that the prominent closure-preserving solutions do not
apply to the new paradox, I will argue that it presents a much stronger case against the
claim that justification is closed under deduction than its two predecessors. Besides
presenting a more robust counterexample to closure, the new paradox also reveals that
the strategies that were previously thought to get closure out of trouble are not suffi-
ciently general to achieve this task as they fail to apply to similar closure-threatening
paradoxes in the same vicinity.
Keywords Lottery paradox · Preface paradox · Multi premise closure · Paradox of
the pill
1 Introduction
The thought that justification is closed under multi premise deduction, i.e. that we are
justified in believing what deductively follows from our antecedently justified beliefs,
is undeniably an attractive one. Yet two familiar paradoxes, the lottery paradox and the
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preface paradox put pressure on this claim. In response to these challenges, proponents
of multi premise closure have proposed various solutions to the two paradoxes that
do not involve the rejection of multi premise closure. One popular closure-preserving
response to the lottery paradox is to deny that we can justifiably belief of any lottery
ticket, regardless of the size of the lottery, that it is a loser. A common motivation for
this view is that purely statistical evidence alone is insufficient for justification and
that justification requires more than high probability—I will call solutions that fall
into this category, Solutions from Statistical Evidence.1 Similarly, in response to the
preface paradox, it is popular for proponents of multi premise closure to deny that
purely inductive reasons for believing that the author’s book contains at least one error
are sufficient for justification. Instead they often argue that justification for believing
that the author’s book contains any errors requires some sort of special reason—I will
call this family of solutions, Solutions from Defending the Conjunction.2
The primary objective of this paper is to introduce a new epistemic paradox—The
Paradox of the Pill—which retains core features of the original paradoxes, but cannot
be resolved by either Solutions from Statistical Evidence or Solutions from Defending
the Conjunction. This makes the new paradox a more compelling counterexample
to the claim that justification is closed under multi premise deduction than its two
predecessors. Furthermore, besides presenting a more robust counter example to the
claim that justification is deductively closed, the new paradox also brings into focus
the limitations of various strategies that were previously thought to get closure out
of trouble. I will argue that extant solutions to these paradoxes have exploited certain
features of the lottery and the preface narratives that are inessential to the creation of
closure-threatening paradoxes. From this we can conclude that these solutions have
been too tailor-made and fail to get at the heart of the problem.
The plan is as follows. In Sect. 2 I will briefly present the three epistemic principles
that are jointly responsible for the lottery and the preface paradox. Sections 3 and 4
will introduce the lottery and the preface paradox in turn and present some popular
solutions available to those wanting to defend multi premise closure. In Sect. 5 I
will outline the structure of a new paradox that would be immune to these closure-
preserving solutions. Section 6 will develop this paradox and defend the claim that it
makes a stronger case against multi premise closure than its two predecessors. Finally,
in Sect. 7 I will discuss some more general concerns about previous solutions to the
lottery and the preface paradox.
2 Three epistemic principles
The lottery paradox, first introduced by Kyburg (1961), and the preface paradox, first
introduced by Makinson (1965), pivot on three epistemic principles.
1 Proponents of this strategy include Kaplan (1996), Ryan (1996), Nelkin (2000), Buchak (2014) and
Staffel (2016).
2 Proponents of this response to the preface paradox include Pollock (1986), Ryan (1991), Leplin (2009),
Kaplan (2013), Kim (2015) and Smith (2016).
123
Synthese
Sufficiency Thesis (ST) If p is highly probable for S, then S is justified in believing
p.3
Multi Premise Closure (MPC) If S is justified in believing p, and S is justified in
believing q, then S is justified in believing the conjunction (p & q).
No Contradiction (NC) S is never justified in believing (p and ∼p).
While each of these principles is individually plausible, the two paradoxes demon-
strate that they are jointly inconsistent. The difficulty lies in negotiating which of
the principles to modify or reject. (ST) captures the popular view that epistemic
justification is best explained by something along the lines of probability above a
certain threshold. Threshold views of justification, with a threshold value t < 1,
are popular because they can easily accommodate a number of features often asso-
ciated with epistemic justification, for instance that justification is fallible and does
not require certainty, or credence 1, and that justification comes in degrees.4 (MPC),
which simply states that agents are justified in believing the conjunction of their
individually justified beliefs, while being intuitively compelling, has often been iden-
tified as the culprit in our epistemic paradoxes. Denying (MPC) however is generally
considered to be a costly move and the apparent oddity of accepting that an agent
can have a number of beliefs that are individually justified but fail to be justified in
believing them together has motivated many to try and defend (MPC). Finally, (NC)
states that one cannot justifiably believe a contradiction. (NC) is widely regarded as
a fundamental constraint on theories of justification and generally considered to be
beyond reproach. For the purpose of this paper I will follow this orthodoxy and regard
(NC) as non-negotiable. The next two sections introduce the lottery and the preface
paradox and outline some popular solutions available to those wishing to preserve
(MPC).
3 This formulation of the Sufficiency Thesis is adapted from Kelp (2017). Sometimes the lottery and preface
paradox are presented in terms of the Lockean Thesis, which explains rational belief in terms of rational
degrees of confidence or credences.
(LT) It is rational for you to believe p just in case it is rational for you to have degree of confidence y in p,
where y > x. (Foley 1992: p. 112)
(ST) is essentially a justification analogue of the Lockean Thesis. One nice feature of (ST) is that it stays
neutral on what epistemic factors we use to explain justification. The antecedent of (ST) could be spelled
out internalistically in terms of degrees of belief or credences, but it is also compatible with other accounts
of justification, for instance reliabilist accounts, which do not explain justification in terms of degrees of
belief. In this sense (ST) is a more general principle that captures a wider range of views than (LT).
In recent work Leitgeb (2017) proposed a contextualized version of (ST), which offers additional resources
for dealing with the puzzles discussed below. A full assessment of this strategy and its implications however
falls outside of the scope of this paper.
4 Different versions of (ST) might be motivated in different ways. For instance, as an anonymous referee
helpfully pointed out, one of the primary motivations for the Lockean Thesisis is that an agent who has a
very high credence in P but fails to believe P somehow seems rationally deficient. This idea could also be
used to motivate (ST) under two assumptions: (i) that we can equate between justification and rationality
and (ii) that high probability is explained in terms of ‘high credence’. While discussions of the lottery and
preface paradox often implicitly accept (i), for the purpose of this paper I want to remain neutral on (ii).
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3 The lottery paradox
Consider Juliet who enters a fair lottery with n tickets and a guaranteed winner. Assum-
ing that Juliet knows these facts about the lottery, then for any threshold value t < 1
used to spell out ‘high probability’ in (ST) we can always construct a lottery large
enough to create the following paradox.
(L1) For any ticket Juliet is justified in believing that the ticket will lose; JBJ(t1) &
JBJ(t2) ... & JBJ(tn).
(L2) If Juliet is justified in believing of any given ticket that it will lose, then Juliet is
justified in believing that all tickets will lose; JBJ(t1 & t2 ... & tn).
(L3) Since Juliet knows that the lottery is fair and that it has a guaranteed winner, Juliet
is justified in believing that at least one ticket will win; JBJ ∼ (t1 & t2 ...& tn).
When combined with (MPC), (L1) – (L3) entail a violation of (NC) as they give rise
to the following contradiction.
(L4) Juliet is justified in believing that every ticket will lose and that one ticket will
win; JBJ((t1 & t2 ...& tn) & ∼ (t1 & t2 ...& tn)).
Since accepting the contradiction in (L4) is unacceptable as it would mean rejecting
(NC) and rejecting (L3) is not a live option given the setup, we are left with two
alternatives: either we reject (L1), the claim that Juliet is justified in believing of any
ticket in the lottery that it will lose, or we reject (L2), the claim that Juliet is justified in
believing that all tickets are losers. The former requires rejecting (ST), while the latter
requires rejecting (MPC). Proponents of the first strategy include Ryan (1996), Kaplan
(1996), Nelkin (2000), Leplin (2009), Buchak (2014), Staffel (2016), and Smith (2010,
2016). Proponents of the second strategy include Kyburg (1961), Foley (1992, 2009),
David (2004), and Sturgeon (2008). Thus, if (MPC) is to be preserved we may simply
deny (L1) and insist that lottery beliefs, no matter how probable, fail to be justified.
Denying justification for lottery propositions is of course at odds with (ST)—after
all lottery propositions can be highly probable—and proponents of this strategy must
somehow reconcile this tension. This is usually done in one of two ways: (a) by
proposing modifications to (ST) or (b) by rejecting (ST) altogether and replacing
it with an entirely different notion of justification. Whilst Leplin (2009) and Smith
(2010, 2016) recently opted for a more radical strategy along the lines of (b), this
paper is primarily concerned with the more common and less radical modificationist
strategies of type (a). The result of these modifications is usually to prevent beliefs
based on purely statistical evidence to count as justified. Following this strategy we
get a modified version of the Sufficiency Thesis along the following lines.
(ST*) If p is highly probable for S and further conditions are met, then S is
justified in believing p.
One influential closure-preserving strategy along these lines is due to Dana Nelkin
(2000: p. 388).5 Nelkin argues that what initially motivates an acceptance of (L1) is a
certain inference pattern, which she calls p-inferences.
5 Similar views are defended or echoed in Kaplan (1996), Enoch et al. (2012), Buchak (2014) and Staffel
(2016).
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(P-inference) p has a statistical probability of n [where n is a very high number]
→ p
This inference pattern however, Nelkin argues, should be rejected. In order for a
belief to be justified, so the argument continues, it requires more than just high sta-
tistical probability. More specifically, in order for a belief to be justified according
to Nelkin an agent must also be in a position to suppose that there exists a causal
or explanatory connection between the belief and the facts that would make it true.
Consider for instance beliefs based on perceptual experiences. For such beliefs, we
are usually in a position to suppose that there exists a causal connection between the
belief and the facts that would make the belief true, i.e. the objects perceived. For
beliefs about lottery tickets on the other hand this condition is not met, as there is no
causal connection between the belief that your ticket will lose and the fact that would
make the lottery belief true, i.e. the drawing of the lottery; We would believe that our
ticket was a loser even if it was the case that we had the winning ticket. As a result,
Nelkin argues, beliefs in lottery propositions are not justified. Thus the lottery paradox
is solved and closure is preserved.
Closure-preserving solutions following this strategy exploit the fact that in lotteries
the relevant evidence is purely statistical. All that is needed to solve the lottery paradox
whilst preserving (MPC), is a properly motivated rejection of the idea that statistical
evidence alone can justify beliefs. Let us call solutions to the lottery paradox following
this strategy Solutions from Statistical Evidence. Importantly, solutions that set out to
solve the lottery paradox by rejecting (L1) are motivated by, or at least rely on, the
fact that it strikes us as intuitively acceptable to deny justification for lottery beliefs.
Douven (2008) makes the stronger claim that denying justification for lottery beliefs
does not just strike us as an intuitively acceptable response, but that it strikes many
as the intuitively correct response; “Many have the intuition that the right response to
the Lottery Paradox is to deny that one can justifiably believe of even a single lottery
ticket that it will lose” (204).6
4 The preface paradox
The preface paradox is structurally related to the lottery paradox as it too involves
a combination of (ST), (MPC), and (NC) to create a seemingly inconsistent set of
beliefs. The paradox is often presented as follows.
An author has just finished an ambitious, yet carefully researched, book. On
the basis of her research the author has good evidence for every claim made in
the book and is justified in believing that each claim made in the book is true.
However the author is also aware that when it comes to ambitious books, even
the best scholarship can turn out to contain errors and in the past this has always
been the case. In light of this the author includes in the preface of her work an
apology for any errors in her book.
6 It is important to point out that Douven is only summarizing the state of the debate; he is not endorsing
this as the correct solution to the lottery paradox.
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The author’s epistemic position is considered to be problematic as she appears to be
justified in believing that each claim in her book is true whilst also being justified
in believing that there is at least one error in her book. The formal structure of the
paradox can be captured as follows.
(P1) The author is justified in believing each claim made in the book; JBA(p1) &
JBA(p2) ... & JBA(pn).
(P2) If the author is justified in believing each claim made in her book is true, then the
author is justified in believing that all claims made in her book are true; JBA(p1
& p2 .. & pn).
(P3) The author is justified in believing that her book contains at least one error;
JBA ∼ (p1 & p2 ... & pn).
However, taken together (MPC) and (P1)–(P3) entail a violation of (NC) as they
combine to produce the following contradiction.
(P4) The author is justified in believing a contradiction, namely that all claims in
her book are true and that there are errors in her book; JBJ((p1 & p2 ..& pn) &
∼ (p1 & p2 ... & pn)).
As in the lottery paradox, there are two prominent solutions to the preface paradox.
One option is to reject (P2), which would effectively deny (MPC). Alternatively, those
sympathetic to closure have the option of rejecting (P3) instead. Advocates of this
latter strategy include Pollock (1986), Ryan (1991), Leplin (2009), Kaplan (2013),
Kim (2015), and Smith (2016).
Arguments for rejecting (P3) typically pivot on the idea that the author’s mere
recognition of her own fallibility is not sufficient to justify the belief that her book will
contain any errors. Given that our author has good reasons supporting every claim in
the book, mere doubt arising from recognizing her fallibility is insufficient to defeat
justification for believing the conjunction. To support this claim, Kaplan emphasizes
the lack of a special reason for believing that the book contains any errors, “ … [the
author] should stand by her book—she should not shrink from saying that everything in
it is true—until she has found special reason to think it contains an error” (2013: p. 16).7
Importantly, according to Kaplan and others following this strategy, the author is of
course perfectly justified in believing that her book will likely contain errors; “ [The
author] is even free to confess to being confident that her book will turn out to contain
some error or other. The only thing she cannot flatly say (or say anything that entails)
that her book has errors” (2013: p. 17).8 Similar remarks can be found in recent work
by Kim, “... while authors are reasonable to assert that surely there are errors, the
reasonableness of this assertion does not imply that they are rational to believe that
there are errors” (2015: p. 1024).9 Thus Kaplan and Kim invite us to replace (P3) with
a weaker premise along the following lines.
(P3*) The author is justified in believing that it is likely that errors will be found
in her book.
7 Emphasis in italics added.
8 Emphasis in italics added.
9 Emphasis in italics added.
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With (P3*) in place the paradox is resolved because there is no contradiction in our
author believing that all claims made in her book are true whilst also believing it to
be likely that her book contains at least one error.
Thus it seems that proponents of closure can once again defuse the challenge of
a supposedly closure-threatening paradox. Proponents of (MPC) can exploit the fact
that in the preface paradox there is nospecial reason for believing that the conjunction
in question is false. Let us call solutions of this ilk, Solutions From Defending the
Conjunction.
5 The possibility of a third related paradox
Thus far I have argued that neither the lottery paradox nor the paradox of the preface
are able to make a decisive case against the claim that justification is closed under multi
premise deduction. As we have seen, each paradox has a certain feature that proponents
of (MPC) can exploit in responding to the respective puzzles. In the lottery paradox
proponents of closure can exploit the fact that the evidence in question is purely
statistical and resort to Solutions from Statistical Evidence. Likewise in the preface
case proponents can appeal to Solutions From Defending the Conjunction seeing that
there is no special reason for believing that the conjunction is false.
At this point one might wonder if it is possible to construct a new closure threat-
ening paradox that would be immune to Solution from Statistical Evidence as well as
Solutions From Defending the Conjunction. Such a paradox would have to satisfy the
following two conditions: (a) the beliefs in the individual conjuncts must not be based
on purely statistical evidence and (b) there must be a special reason for believing that
a sufficiently long conjunction will contain an error. We can expect a paradox with
these features to present a more robust counterexample to the claim that justification is
closed under deduction than its two predecessors. However, currently there is no para-
dox available that has precisely this mix of features.10 The next section will present
such a paradox and fill this lacuna.
10 An anonymous referee helpfully suggested that a certain variant of the preface paradox—the Homo-
geneous Preface Paradox—recently proposed by Easwaran and Fitelson (2015) might meet these two
conditions. In what follows I will briefly argue that there are very good reasons for thinking that the
Homogeneous Preface Paradox, like the standard preface paradox, fails to meet condition (b). As a result,
proponents of (MPC) will be able to respond to the Homogeneous Preface Paradox by appeal to Solutions
From Defending the Conjunction. In the Homogeneous Preface Paradox, unlike in the standard preface
paradox, (P3) is not just supported by general second-order evidence about our human fallibility; instead
the author, John, an empirical scientist, writes an ambitious book about the very hypothesis (H): that all
scientific/empirical books of sufficient complexity contain at least one false claim (2015: p. 10). So, John,
rather than having only second-order evidence in support of the claim that his book contains at least one
error, now infers the belief from the first-order claims in his book. Does this change in the type of evidence
supporting (P3) amount to there being any special reason for thinking that John’s book contains any errors?
Arguably not. Sure, John has written a book rich in first-order claims supporting (H), a hypothesis about
the general fallibility of ambitious scientific works, but these claims do not provide any special reason
in support of the claim that John’s book contains any error. As Kaplan suggests, “even if there are other
authors of comparably ambitious works, no less careful (and, perhaps, some more meticulous) than [the
author], who have nonetheless failed to write error-free books. Those aren’t special reasons for not standing
behind [the author’s] book; they are reasons that are routinely present…” (2013: p. 16). In the case of John
then, the first-order claims supporting (H) fail to be special reasons for believing that his book contains
any errors, for the claims supporting (H) will be routinely present as they bear no special relation to John’s
current book—they will apply equally to his next book. Hence, there are strong reasons for thinking that
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6 A bitter pill for closure
Consider the following case.
S is given a bitter pill that ensures that a very small portion of S’s ordinarily
justified beliefs, let’s say 1 out of every 10,000, chosen at random, will be false.
The pill achieves this result by occasionally impairing S’s cognitive connection
to the evidence resulting in occurrences of, for instance, misperceptions or false
memories. Importantly however these occurrences are incredibly rare. Finally,
S knows about the effects of the bitter pill.11
Let’s briefly consider S’s epistemic situation after taking the pill. After taking the pill
S continues to form beliefs like everyone else and the vast majority of those beliefs,
will turn out to be true—S will continue to form beliefs based on perception, memory,
and testimony, etc. just as before taking the pill. However, not all of S’s justified beliefs
will be true, for the pill ensures that a small number of beliefs, chosen at random, are
going to be false. Considering that these occurrences are extremely rare and that the
vast majority of S’s beliefs will remain entirely unaffected, we should expect that the
overall impact of the pill on S’s epistemic situation should be rather minimal. After
all it is likely that we already form and sustain a host of false beliefs anyways and
that we are no strangers to the occasional adaptation of a false belief. Furthermore,
most theories of justification take as a starting point the assumption that justification
is fallible and that there are instances of justified false beliefs. In accordance with this
fallibilist spirit, (ST) will predict that those of S’s beliefs that are made sufficiently
probable by S’s evidence will continue to be justified.
From the pill case we can derive a puzzle similar to the lottery and the preface
paradox. Let’s call this new paradox, The Paradox of the Pill.
(BP1) S, after taking the pill, continues to be justified in believing the propositions
made sufficiently probable by her evidence; JBS(p1) & JBS(p2) ... & JBS(pn).
(BP2) S is justified in believing the conjunction of her individually justified beliefs;
JBS(p1 & p2 .. & pn).
(BP3) S is justified in believing that the conjunction of her justified beliefs will contain
at least some false belief; JBS ∼ (p1 & p2 .. & pn).
The combination of (BP2) and (BP3) however violates (NC) as it commits S to an
inconsistent set of beliefs. Under closure S is justified in believing the conjunction
of her individually justified beliefs, whilst the effects of the pill also justify her in
believing that a long enough conjunction of her individually justified beliefs is going
to be false.
Footnote 10 continued
the Homogeneous Preface Paradox does not meet condition (b). Moreover, in the absence of any special
reason for believing that the book contains at least one error, proponents of (MPC) can respond to the
Homogeneous Preface Paradox by appealing to Solutions From Defending the Conjunction.
11 As with most thought experiments it is of course perfectly possible to provide an alternative narrative
to capture the same epistemically relevant features. Those who find the pill case conceptually problematic
are free to come up with an alternative narrative as long as it incorporates the same epistemic features – one
obvious candidate would be a malevolent demon, which decides to deceive an agent about a small number
of randomly chosen beliefs.
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(BP4) S is justified in believing a contradiction, namely that the conjunction of her
justified beliefs is true and that some members of the conjunction are false;
JBJ((p1&p2..&pn) & ∼ (p1 & p2 .. & pn)).
As in the previous cases, solving the paradox will require rejecting either (BP1), (BP2),
or (BP3). If (MPC) is to be preserved, then (BP2) must be retained. This leaves (BP1)
or (BP3). However, neither of the popular solutions for solving closure puzzles will
deliver this result; neither Solutions from Statistical Evidence, which would target the
individual conjuncts in (BP1), nor Solutions From Defending the Conjunction, which
would target (BP3), will apply to the new paradox.
Solutions from Defending the Conjunction, which were plausible in response to
the preface paradox, turn out to be unavailable in the case of the pill paradox. Recall,
that in response to the preface paradox Kaplan and others argued that there was no
special reason for believing that the conjunction would contain any errors. It was this
feature of the preface paradox that proponents of (MPC) exploited to reject (P3). In the
paradox of the pill however, there does exist such a special reason—the effects of the
pill guarantee that a sufficiently long conjunction will contain at least one false belief.
As a result, Solutions from Defending the Conjunction do not provide the necessary
resources for rejecting (BP3) in the new puzzle.
Similar worries arise for Solutions from Statistical Evidence. Recall that Solutions
from Statistical Evidence attempt to solve the lottery paradox by denying that purely
statistical evidence, no matter how strong, is sufficient for justification. An influential
argument for this type of strategy was due to Nelkin who argued that in order for
a belief to be justified an agent must be in a position to assume that there exists a
causal or explanatory connection between the belief and the evidence that will make
it true. In case of the paradox of the pill however these types of solutions will fail.
In the paradox of the pill, S’s beliefs are not based on purely statistical evidence, as
S continues to form beliefs based on perception, testimony, memory, etc. And since
S’s beliefs are formed using these ordinary methods, for every individual belief, S
will be in a position to suppose that there exists a causal or explanatory connection
between her belief and the facts that would make the belief true. Furthermore, consider
that even under ordinary circumstances our beliefs are liable to occasional errors. We
would not however conclude that this gets in the way of supposing that generally there
exists a causal connection between our beliefs and the facts that make it true. Since
we are no strangers to the occasional formation of false beliefs and since this does not
compromise the assumption that our beliefs are causally connected to the evidence,
there is no reason to deny that after taking the pill the agent can assume, for each
belief, that there exists a causal connection between the belief and the facts that would
make it true. Thus Solutions from Statistical Evidence will also not be able to solve
the new paradox.
Since the prominent closure-preserving solution fail to apply the new puzzle, it
appears that the most promising way out of the paradox is to reject (BP2), and as a result
(MPC). To cement this conclusion let’s briefly consider the prospects of alternative
strategies for rejecting (BP1), i.e. strategies that would solve the lottery by rejecting
(L1) and that would in principle apply to the new paradox. Pollock (1983) and Ryan
(1996), for instance, reject (L1) on the more general ground that whenever one has
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a set of beliefs and it is known that the set contains at least one false member, then,
assuming one does not know which of the members is false, one is not justified in
believing any member of the set.12 In the case of the new paradox, these considerations
might motivate a rejection of (BP1) by insisting that after taking the pill none of S’s
beliefs are justified. However, recall that strategies akin to Solutions from Statistical
Evidence that reject (L1) by denying that we can have justified beliefs about lottery
tickets are motivated by, or at least rely on, the idea that denying justification for lottery
beliefs strikes us as an intuitively acceptable response. Douven made the stronger
claim that denying justification for lottery beliefs is not just an intuitively acceptable
response, but that it is the intuitively correct response. In case of the Paradox of the
Pill however, insisting that all of S’s beliefs are unjustified no longer strikes us as
an intuitively correct, or even intuitively acceptable, result. Seeing that the pill only
affects 0.01% of beliefs, it appears that embracing global skepticism about justification
(and presumably knowledge) is an excessively costly and unconvincing response to
the new puzzle; especially if we recall that most accounts of justification depart from
the idea that justification is fallible, i.e. that we can have justified false beliefs. Thus,
even strategies that solve the lottery by rejecting (L1) and that would in principle apply
to the new paradox by rejecting (BP1) will not get closure out of trouble. In the case of
the new paradox, these solutions lose their intuitive plausibility, which is what made
them promising closure-preserving solutions to the Lottery Paradox in the first place.
A final response to the Paradox of the Pill might try to avoid the skeptical impli-
cation of the above strategies by proposing that only some of S’s post-pill beliefs are
unjustified.13 This, one might hope, would go some way towards making the rejection
of (BP1) a more plausible response to the new paradox. This proposal however faces
a serious objection. First, recall that the effects of the pill are both global, i.e. the pill
could affect any of S’s beliefs, and random. This means that for every belief, regardless
of its precise degree of evidential support or how confident S is about its truth, there
exists an equal chance that it is affected by the pill. Put differently, we might say that
with regards to the pill, all of S’s beliefs are epistemically on par. For the idea of deny-
ing the justificatory status of only some of S’s beliefs this gives rise to the following
problem: Since the threat of the pill applies equally to all of S’s beliefs, there will
be no principled way for choosing which beliefs are unjustified. Therefore, choosing
which of S’s beliefs fail to be justified would be arbitrary. Arbitrarily choosing some
of S’s beliefs and insisting that they, despite being highly probable on S’s evidence,
are unjustified seems difficult to motivate and makes for an unsatisfactory response to
the new paradox.
To strengthen this point we might consider analogies to the lottery and the preface
paradox. In responding to the lottery paradox we would be reluctant to accept a pro-
posal suggesting that we can arbitrarily choose some tickets about which to suspend
judgment, whilst insisting that for the remaining tickets we are justified in believ-
12 To motivate this claim, Ryan (1996) appeals to a principle she calls the ‘Avoid Falsity Principle’ while
Pollock (1983) introduces the idea that became known as ‘Collective Defeat’.
13 I want to thank two anonymous referees for bringing this proposal to my attention.
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ing that they are losers.14 For this reason, the justificatory status of lottery beliefs is
usually taken to be an all or nothing matter – either you are justified in believing of
every ticket that it is a loser, or you lack justification for believing that any of them
are losers. Seeing that the randomness of the pill’s effect mirrors a lottery, the same
‘all or nothing’ reasoning should apply in the Paradox of the Pill. Likewise, as far as I
know, no one has seriously proposed solving the preface paradox by simply choosing
some claims in the book and insisting that the author lacks justification for believing
precisely those claims. After all, in the preface paradox the author has good evidence
supporting each claim in the book; as Eder (2015) warns, “Ignoring this and choos-
ing arbitrarily which propositions not to believe seems to make dealing with rational
belief (evidential support, and rational degrees of belief) somewhat superfluous: this
is not a palatable option here…” (669). Again, these considerations seem to apply
equally in the case of the new paradox—arbitrarily choosing some of S’s beliefs and
denying their justificatory status is not a satisfactory response to the paradox. These
considerations point towards the following strategy for dealing with the Paradox of
the Pill: either we grant that S has justification for every belief that is probable on her
evidence, or, if one thinks that the right response to the paradox somehow involves
rejecting (BP1), then one should be prepared to deny justification for all of S’s beliefs.
Thus aiming to solve the new paradox by targeting (BP1), i.e. by seeking fault with
the individual conjuncts, is likely to be unsatisfactory. As pointed out before however,
many of the popular strategies for solving the lottery paradox by targeting (L1) do not
apply to (BP1) in the first place.
Seeing that many of the prominent closure-preserving strategies are not equipped
to deal with the new puzzle, we can conclude that The Paradox of the Pill makes a
significantly stronger case against (MPC) than its two predecessors.
7 Generality worries for standard closure-preserving solutions
It appears that The Paradox of the Pill is not just bad news for closure. The new
puzzle also licenses some more general concerns about certain strategies for dealing
with the lottery and the preface paradox. Previously it was thought that Solutions from
Statistical Evidence or Solutions from Defending the Conjunction would be all that is
needed to defend closure against the pressure coming from closure puzzles. However,
it now seems that that these solutions have targeted features of the respective puzzles
that turn out to be non-essential for constructing closure-threatening paradoxes. In
other words, the features that these popular closure-preserving solutions target, rather
than being necessary features of closure-threatening paradoxes, are merely incidental
features of the lottery and the preface narratives. What the Paradox of the Pill illustrates,
is that in close vicinity to the lottery and the preface paradox there lurk relevantly
similar epistemic puzzles to which the prominent closure preserving solutions that
were previously thought to get closure out of trouble do not apply.
14 This claim, which is often just take for granted, is made explicit by Harman (2002). For an exception
see Kroedel (2012).
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The central idea underlying Solutions from Statistical Evidence put forth in response
to the lottery paradox was that purely statistical evidence, no matter how strong, does
not justify beliefs. This strategy identifies the statistical nature of the evidence as a
crucial feature of the lottery paradox. Thus, proponents of Solutions from Statistical
Evidence identify something along the lines of Nelkin’s p-inferences as an essential
feature of the puzzle.
(P-inference) p has a statistical probability of n [where n is a very high number]
→ p.
Subsequently, proponents of closure proposed modifications to the Sufficiency Thesis
that would exclude beliefs based solely on statistical evidence from being justified.
Recall Nelkin’s proposal that for a belief to be justified an agent must be in a position to
presuppose a casual connection to the facts. This strategy would of course be successful
if it was an essential part of the puzzle that the individual conjuncts be supported by
purely statistical evidence. What Nelkin and her followers seem to have overlooked
however, is that one can be in a position to presuppose a casual connection to the
evidence but still be in a lottery like environment. In the pill scenario this is achieved
by building a lottery mechanism into S’s causal connection to the evidence. As a result
we can generate challenges to the closure principle without relying on evidence that
is purely statistical. In other words, we can generate challenges for (MPC) without
relying on p-inferences. This suggests that Solutions from Statistical Evidence are not
sufficiently general to achieve their aim of saving (MPC) as they target a non-essential
feature of the lottery-paradox. The statistical nature of the evidence, rather than being
an essential feature of closure-threatening paradoxes is merely an incidental feature of
the lottery narrative; in this sense the statistical nature of the evidence is a red herring.
Furthermore, strategies like Solutions from Statistical Evidence that set out to solve
the lottery paradox by rejecting (L1)—the premise that we can justifiably believe that
any given lottery ticket will lose—benefit from the fact that denying justification in
lottery propositions is intuitively acceptable. In other words, denying justification for
lottery beliefs does not strike us as particularly problematic or implausible. A possible
explanation for this might be that when it comes to lottery tickets, we generally aren’t
overly concerned about the exact epistemic status of our beliefs. If it turned out that
we are not justified in believing lottery propositions, then so be it; especially if this
allows us to preserve the attractive principle of (MPC). After all it is plausible that our
intuitive pull towards (MPC) outweighs our concerns over the exact epistemic status
of lottery beliefs. However, things are different in the case of The Paradox of the Pill.
In this case rejecting (BP1), i.e. denying that any of S’s beliefs are justified, no longer
strikes us as a plausible or acceptable solution. While it might have been intuitively
acceptable to deny justification for individual lottery beliefs, it does not seem plausible
to respond to a miniscule amount of risk (0.01%) by embracing global skepticism about
justification. It seems again that solution to the lottery paradox that reject (L1) rely on
a specific feature of the paradox—in this case the intuitive acceptability of denying
justification in lottery beliefs – that is not an essential or general feature of closure
puzzles but instead only a by-product of the particular lottery narrative. The Paradox of
the Pill shows that we can create cases in which denying justification for the individual
conjuncts is no longer a plausible strategy for preserving (MPC).
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A similar worry arises for Solutions from Defending the Conjunction produced in
response to the Paradox of the Preface. These solutions, as proposed by Kaplan for
instance, pivot on the idea that in preface cases the author lacks justification for believ-
ing that the conjunction in question is false as there is no ‘special reason’ supporting
it. Subsequently it is suggested that we replace (P3) with the weaker premise (P3*).
(P3*) The author is justified in believing that it is likely that errors will be found
in her book.
In order for this strategy to apply more generally however, Kaplan and his followers
must assume that the lack of a special reason against the conjunction is an essential
feature of closure-threatening puzzles. However, as The Paradox of the Pill shows, we
can easily construct closure-threatening paradoxes that avoid this feature of the preface
paradox. In the paradox of the pill there does exist a special reason to believe that a
sufficiently long conjunction is false, it is guaranteed by the pill’s effects. Subsequently
we cannot replace (BP3) with a weaker premise (BP3*).
(BP3*) S is justified in believing that the conjunction of her justified beliefs will
likely contain at least some false beliefs
(BP3*) would fail to correctly capture the epistemic environment the pill creates, as
the pill does more than just make it likely that a sufficiently long conjunction will be
false—it guarantees it. Thus Solutions from Defending the Conjunction also seem to
target a feature of the preface paradox that is merely incidental to the preface narrative
but not essential for the creation of closure-threatening puzzles. As a result this strategy
also fails to provide a more general solution to the paradoxes that threaten (MPC).
What The Paradox of the Pill shows, is that we can create problematic puzzles that
do not incorporate any of the features previously targeted by many of the popular
closure-preserving solutions to the lottery paradox and the paradox of the preface.
This is the case because both strategies have targeted features of the respective puzzle
that are non-essential for creating puzzles that put pressure on (MPC). In light of this
generality worry, it might be the case that proponents of closure will have to revise
their current strategies or explore alternatives if they want to solve the pill paradox
whilst retaining multi premise closure. Until then however the rejection of closure
seems to remain the most plausible solution to the new paradox.
8 Conclusion
In this paper I developed a new epistemic paradox, The Paradox of the Pill, which
puts pressure on the claim that justification is closed under multi premise deduction.
The new paradox is structurally related to the lottery and the preface paradox but
differs from the two in some relevant respects. First, in contrast to the lottery paradox,
the individual conjuncts are not supported by purely statistical evidence, and second,
in contrast to the preface paradox, the falsity of a sufficiently long conjunction is
guaranteed. These two features make the new puzzle immune to many of the prominent
closure preserving solutions put forth in response to the lottery and preface paradox.
What we end up with is a more robust and convincing counterexample to (MPC)
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and any proponent of multi premise closure must be prepared to provide a response
to this new puzzle. The new paradox also highlights that previous solutions to the
lottery and the preface paradox might need to be reconsidered, seeing that they are
not sufficiently general to resolve structurally similar puzzles in the same vicinity. A
possible explanation for this generality worry is that many of the previous responses
to the lottery and the preface paradox have targeted features of the respective puzzles
that turn out to be non-essential for the creation of closure-threatening paradoxes. As
a result of being too tailor-made, these solutions fail to generalize to relevantly similar
paradoxes in the same vicinity. What these considerations show, is that proponents
of closure have more work to do if they want to provide a convincing defense of the
claim that justification is deductively closed.
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